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1.

When Obama
Embraced Drone
Warfare
HOW, EXACTLY, DID DRONE WARFARE AND TARGETED

killing become key elements in America’s counterterrorism strategy? And why should we care about them as
essential national-security tools for the future?
Barack Obama campaigned for his first presidential term on the platform of ending America’s
wars. Obama voters and much of the rest of the world
figured this promise referred not only to the conventional conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to
what liberals considered the long and unnecessary
national nightmare of the war on terror. It now seems
clear he was misunderstood—though we don’t know
yet whether the misunderstanding was by Obama’s design or due to changes that took place after he assumed
office. Obama’s policy proved not to be “peace breaks
out.” It was, rather, that America would wind down

its two counterinsurgency, boots-on-the-ground wars
and undertake a refocused effort against the terrorists
who had set this all in motion. He framed it this way
during the 2008 race. “If Pakistan cannot or will not
take out al-Qaeda leadership when we have actionable
intelligence about their whereabouts,” he said on the
campaign trail, “we will act to protect the American
people. There can be no safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists.” No safe havens—that has been Barack Obama’s
strategic lodestar in the war on terror.
It is this proposition, more than any other, that
gets us to drone warfare.
Even as Obama publicly disdained the institutions and methodologies of Bush’s war on terror, he
was issuing a new call to arms in that war. Taking
the fight directly to the enemy required a means of
combat other than counterinsurgency warfare on the
ground, and the United States turned to a technology
the Israelis had used effectively in their war against
Palestinian terrorists: unmanned surveillance drones,
now weaponized.
This tool had been used during the Bush administration, but sparingly—largely due to geopolitical fears, but also because it was only by the second
Bush term that the CIA had established ground-level
human-intelligence networks in Afghanistan and
Pakistan sufficient for making independent targeting
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Drones
decisions without having to rely on the questionable
and self-interested information coming from Pakistan’s intelligence services.
The strategy has worked far better than anyone
expected. It is effective, and has rightfully assumed an
indispensable place on the list of strategic elements of
U.S. counterterrorism-on-offense.
But it is not only a strategy of effectiveness, convenience, and necessity. Drone warfare offers ethical
advantages as well, allowing for increased discrimination in time, manner, and targeting not available via
any other comparable weapon platform. As such, it
lends civilians in the path of hostilities vastly greater
protection than does any other fighting tool. Drone
warfare is an honorable attempt to seek out terrorists
and insurgents who hide among civilians.
The expansion into automated and robotic
military equipment owes much to the ethical impulse
to create new technologies of discrimination when
fighting enemies for whom unwitting civilian shields
were their main materiel of war. Moreover, these are
weapons that gain much of their discrimination in
use from the fact that U.S. forces are not directly at
personal risk and are thus able to take time to choose a
moment to attack when civilians might be least at risk.
Remoteness—the fact that the drone user is nowhere
near the target, as the pilot is probably sitting in an
air-conditioned room in Nevada—actually enables
precision.
Ethical and effective—and yet today drone
warfare is coming under increasingly strong public

attack as being neither. Opponents of drones are seeking to raise the political costs of drone warfare to the
United States, portraying it as a symbol of an arrogant,
reprobate superpower dating back to the days of the
“ugly American.” Steve Coll, writing in the New Yorker,
says drone use is “unnervingly reminiscent of Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for poisoning schemes and coup
plots.” And though, in a recent Gallup poll, two-thirds
of those surveyed said they supported drone strikes,
there is no question that the political, legal, and moral
legitimacy of drone warfare is increasingly at risk. The
delegitimators are the international community, both
its UN officials and NGO advocates; a sizable portion
of academic international lawyers; much of the elite
international media; and Obama’s American left.
These delegitimators also include a number of
conservatives and Republicans, chief among them
Kentucky Senator Rand Paul. They claim the core issue
is constitutional—that drones violate due process. This
argument focuses specifically on the case of a radical
cleric and terrorist operative in Yemen, Anwar alAwlaki, who inspired a terrorist assault at Fort Hood
in 2009, designed an al-Qaeda effort to detonate a
plane over Detroit on Christmas Day in the same year,
and was deeply involved in a plot to load printer ink
cartridges with explosives for detonation on a plane.
Awlaki was killed in a targeted drone strike in Yemen
in 2011—and he was an American citizen.
His citizenship, some argue (most vigorously
on the libertarian right), should have prevented the
Obama administration from performing the targeted
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killing. But as an enemy combatant in the war on terror authorized by Congress in 2001, Awlaki could not
be granted some special get-out-of-a-drone-strike-free
card. Given the inherently unsympathetic nature of
the Awlaki example, the due-process arguments of
those on the right who stand in opposition to drone
strikes took an markedly populist and anti-government turn. When the Republican senator Rand Paul
decided to stage a 13-hour filibuster on the question
of the legality of drone strikes, he and others spent a
great deal of time talking not about the violated rights
of a terrorist in Yemen but about the theoretical use of
drones on American soil against a suspected domestic
terrorist “sitting in a café.”
Paul’s critique delighted many conservatives and
libertarians. They loved seeing him and others engage
the Obama administration in a direct and seemingly
high-minded manner, denouncing the “imperial” presidency. But they confused and conflated the Obama
administration’s arguably imperial domestic policies
with policies on national security, war, and foreign
affairs—spheres in which the president has many and
capacious constitutional powers. Moreover, those who
were thrilled did not give much thought to whether
they might see a need for a president they liked better
to have access to those same policies—and whether, in
making common cause with those who have opposed
the war on terror since it began, they are working
to destroy one of its most effective tools not only for
Obama, but for future residents of the White House.

2.

How Drone
Warfare Works
DRONE WARFARE CONSISTS OF TWO DISTINCT THINGS.
The first is a technology of war—the drone itself, such
as the Predator, a “remotely piloted aerial vehicle”
originally designed for pure surveillance. As a surveillance aircraft, it is slow-speed, but (in terms of manned
aircraft) it has immensely long “loiter” times over the
object of interest, clocking in many hours circling at
slow speed. It is noisy, sometimes visible, and vulnerable to any enemy with even a minimal air-defense
system. But it was not designed for use against highly
developed military powers, but for the surveillance
of technologically unsophisticated but potentially

dangerous actors lacking such capabilities. From a
strategic standpoint, the drone offers unparalleled
“persistence” around its target—persistence that can
last months on end and can outstrip what a human
team might monitor on the ground, even if undetected, apart from other air systems.
This feature of Predators and Reapers—the two
forms of drones really at issue today—enables the
second aspect of drone warfare: targeted killing, a
method of using force that takes advantage of drone
technology. But drones and targeted killing are not the
same thing: One is a technology and weapon platform,
the other a way to use it. Targeted killing can be done
not only with drones, but with human teams, too, as
seen most dramatically in the Bin Laden raid by the
Navy SEALs.
Similarly, drones are useful for more than targeted killing. They have broad, indeed rapidly expanding, military functions as a weapons platform—as
evidenced in counterinsurgency strikes in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Yemen against groups of fighters, not
only individuals. This is conventional targeting of hostile forces in conventional conflict, just like one would
see with a manned war plane. They have much in
common. The pilot of a manned craft is often far away
from the target, as would be a drone pilot—over the
horizon or many miles away. Unlike the drone pilot,
however, he might have minimal situational awareness of the actual events on the ground at the target—
his knowledge may be nothing more than instrument
data. A drone pilot may in fact have far greater visual
and other sensor data than the pilot of a manned craft
without handling the distractions caused by the work
to keep a high-speed jet in the air.
The most offensively foolish (though endlessly
repeated) objection raised against drones was the
one made by Jane Mayer in her influential 2009 New
Yorker article, “The Predator War”: that drone pilots
are so distant from their targets that they encourage
a “push-button,” video-game mentality toward killing.
The professional military find the claim bizarre, and it
fails to take into account the other kinds of weapons
and platforms in use. Note, the pilot of a manned craft
is often thousands of feet away and a mile above a
target looking at a tiny coordinates screen. And what
of the sailor, deep in the below-decks of a ship, or a
submarine, firing a cruise missile with no awareness
of any kind about the target hundreds of miles away?
For that matter, the common perception of
drones as a sci-fi combination of total surveillance
and complete discretion in where and when to strike
is simply wrong. The drone pilot might sit in Nevada,
but the drone itself has a limited range, requires an air-
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strip, fuel, repairs, and 200 or so personnel to keep it
in the air. All this physical infrastructure must be close
to the theater of operations. Stress rates among drone
pilots are at least as high as those of manned aircraft
pilots; they are far from having a desensitized attitude
toward killing. This appears to be partially because
these are not mere combat operations but fundamentally and primarily intelligence operations. Drone
pilots engaged in targeted killing operations watch
their targets from a very personal distance via sensor
technology, through which they track intimate, daily
patterns of life to gather information and, perhaps, to
determine precisely the best moment to strike, when
collateral damage might be least.
As one drone operator told me, it is not as if one
sees the terrible things the target is engaged in doing
that made him a target in the first place; instead, it
feels, after a few weeks of observation, as though you
are killing your neighbor.
In any case, the mentality of drone pilots in
targeted-killing ops is irrelevant to firing decisions;
they do not make decisions to fire weapons. The very
existence of a remote platform, one with long loiter
times and maximum tactical surveillance, enables decisions to fire by committee. And deliberately so, notes
Gregory McNeal, a professor of law at Pepperdine University, who has put together the most complete study
of the still largely secret decision-making process—the
so-called disposition lists and kill matrix the New York
Times has described in front page stories. It starts
from the assessment of intelligence through meetings
in which determinations, including layers of legal
review, are made about whether a potential target has
sufficient value and, finally, whether and when to fire
the weapon in real time. The drone pilot is just a pilot.
Targeting is therefore a bureaucratized process
that necessarily relies on judgment and estimations
of many uncertainties. Its discretionary and bloodless nature alarms critics, as does its bureaucratic
regularization. Yet it is essential to understand, as McNeal observes, that this is not fundamentally different
from any other process of targeting that takes place
in conventional war, save that it seeks to pinpoint
the targets. Conventional war targeting, by contrast,
seeks not individuals, but merely formations of hostile
forces as groups. In either case, targeting is inherently
intelligence-driven and a highly organized activity,
whether in the military or across the broader nationalsecurity agencies.
Concerns about the nature of the warfare itself
leads to a sharing and checking of that discretion
among actors; in turn, this leads to committees’ making decisions; and by the time this process of bureau-
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cratic rationalization is complete, it looks like military
targeting processes in conventional war, with an extra
dollop of intelligence assessments, not some mysterious Star Chamber assassination committee. After all,
any group of generals deciding where to hit the enemy
in war is, by definition, a “kill list” committee.

3.

What Makes
Drone Warfare
Strategically Eﬀective?
ARE DRONE TECHNOLOGY AND TARGETED KILLING

really so strategically valuable? The answer depends in
great part not on drone technology, but on the quality
of the intelligence that leads to a particular target in the
first place. The drone strike is the final kinetic act in a
process of intelligence-gathering and analysis. The success—and it is remarkable success—of the CIA in disrupting al-Qaeda in Pakistan has come about not because of
drones alone, but because the CIA managed to establish,
over years of effort, its own ground-level, human-intelligence networks that have allowed it to identify targets
independent of information fed to it by Pakistan’s intelligence services. The quality of drone-targeted killing
depends fundamentally on that intelligence, for a drone
is not much use unless pointed toward surveillance of a
particular village, area, or person.
It can be used for a different kind of targeting
altogether: against groups of fighters with their weapons on trucks headed toward the Afghan border. But
these so-called signature strikes are not, as sometimes
represented, a relaxed form of targeted killing in
which groups are crudely blown up because nothing
is known about individual members. Intelligence assessments are made, including behavioral signatures
such as organized groups of men carrying weapons,
suggesting strongly that they are “hostile forces” (in
the legal meaning of that term in the U.S. military’s
Standing Rules of Engagement). That is the norm in
conventional war.
Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets,
by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent
intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance
capabilities—but much of the drone’s contribution will
be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the
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planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to
pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.
Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality
intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled
means to strike directly at terrorist organizations
without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency
approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens.
It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply
defensive measures, such as homeland security alone.
Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against
the terrorists and their leadership.
If one believes, as many of the critics of drone
warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive—including those that
eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law
enforcement and criminal law—then the strategic
virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists
themselves will seem small. But that has not been
American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration—and
not by the Congress of the United States, which has
authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight
the war on terror aggressively. The United States has
used many offensive methods in the past dozen years:
Regime change of states offering safe havens, counterinsurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common
enemies are examples of the methods that are just of
military nature.
Drone warfare today is integrated with a much
larger strategic counterterrorism target—one in which,
as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist
groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an
honored central role to transnational terrorist groups.
This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United
States, along with France and even the UN, has moved
to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and
execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is
hard to plan for years down the road if you have some
reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but
have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying
anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have
acknowledged in communications, have a significant
impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.
This is all subject to objections, of course, and
the objections generally fall into three categories: unnecessary, ineffective, or counterproductive.
There are some who argue that drone warfare
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is unnecessary because the right approach is simply
to defend the homeland from within the homeland;
among liberals this is often a way of saying, fight terrorists with law enforcement and criminal law, while
among some conservatives it corresponds closely with
the resurgence of right-wing isolationism.
Other critics argue that drone warfare is ineffective because killing one operational commander merely means that another rises to take his place. This is the
source of the oft-heard remark that drone warfare is
a “whack-a-mole” strategy: Kill one here and another
pops up there. Drone warfare is nothing more than a
tactic masquerading as a strategy, it is said. Worse, it
indulges one of the oldest and most seductive quests of
modern military technology, the one that says you can
win a war from the air alone.
The whack-a-mole criticism is wildly overstated
and, as a matter of terrorist leadership, simply not
true. Captured terrorist communications show that
qualified and experienced operational commanders
are not so easy to come by. One can argue that the
failure to carry off large-scale attacks in the West is the
result of the defensive hardening of targets and better
homeland security, which is certainly true; but culling
the ranks of terrorist leaders and the resulting inability to plan another 9/11 is also critical.

4.

Blowback
THE MOST PROMINENT CRITIQUE TODAY, HOWEVER,

is that drone warfare is counterproductive because it
produces “blowback.” What is blowback?
Blowback comprises the supposed bad consequences of drones that swamp the benefits, if any,
of drone warfare itself—the anger of villagers whose
civilian relatives have been killed, for instance, or the
resentment among larger populations in Pakistan or
Yemen over drone strikes. The anger, we are told, is
fanned by Islamist preachers, local media, and global
Web communities, and then goes global in the ummah about the perceived targeting of Muslims and
Islam. This leads to radicalization and membership
recruitment where the strikes take place. Or maybe it
leads to independently organized violence—perhaps
the case of the Boston bombers, though it is too early
to say. All this bad public perception outweighs whatever tactical value, if any, drone strikes might have.
The Case for Drones : June 2013

Blowback can never be dismissed, because it
might be true in some cases. But even when true, it
would exist as a matter of degree, to be set against the
benefits of the drone strikes themselves. By definition,
blowback is a second-order effect, and its diffuse nature makes its existence more a matter of subjective
judgment than any other evaluation of drone warfare.
As a hypothesis, the possibility of blowback arises in
two distinct settings: “narrow” counterinsurgency and
“broad” global counterterrorism.
The narrow blowback hypothesis concerns
those in communities directly affected by global counterterrorism drone strikes while the United States is
trying to carry out a ground-level counterinsurgency
campaign. The question is whether civilians, women
and children especially, are being killed by drones in
such numbers—because collateral damage is a fact,
including from drone strikes—that they make these
local communities even more fertile ground for
anti-American operations. Do the drone strikes make
things unacceptably more difficult for ground forces
attempting to carry out a hearts-and-minds campaign
to win over the local population?
Direct and immediate concerns about villagers’
perceptions during the counterinsurgencies in Iraq
and Afghanistan led, at some points, to extraordinary
(from the standpoint of lawful targeting and acceptable collateral damage) measures against using air
power and even infantry to fire back at insurgents. But
local counterinsurgency is not the long-term concern
today; global counterterrorism is. Village-level resentments fueling recruitment might be a concern, but
this type of blowback matters far less in terms of war
fighting when the United States no longer has infantry
in those places (and is no longer making its counterterrorism policy rest upon the chimera of a stable, democratic Afghanistan).
It is sharply contested, to say the least, whether
and to what extent drone strikes are creating blowback
among villagers, or whether and to what extent, as a
former British soldier recently returned from Afghanistan remarked to me, villagers are sad to see the Taliban
commander who just insisted on marrying someone’s
young daughter blown up in an airstrike. There is also
debate about the degree to which villagers are aware
that the American drones are undertaking strikes that
the Pakistani government might otherwise undertake.
Critics often neglect to focus on the Pakistani government’s regular and brutal assaults in the tribal zones.
Despite a general perception that all of Pakistan is united against drone strikes, voices in the Pakistani newspapers have often made note that the tribal areas fear
the Pakistani army far more than they fear U.S. drones,
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because, despite mistakes and inevitable civilian casualties, they see them as smaller and more precise. But
the blunt reality is that as the counterinsurgency era
ends for U.S. forces, narrow blowback concerns about
whether villages might be sufficiently provoked against
American infantry are subsiding.
That leaves the broader claim of global blowback—the idea that drone campaigns are effectively
creating transnational terrorists as well as sympathy
for their actions. That could always be true and could
conceivably outweigh all other concerns. But the evidence is so diffuse as to be pointless. Do Gallup polls of
the general Pakistani population indicate overwhelming resentment about drone strikes—or do they really
suggest that more than half the country is unaware of a
drone campaign at all? Recent polls found the latter to
be the case. Any causal connections that lead from supposed resentments to actual terrorist recruitment are
contingent and uncertain. Discussing global blowback
is also an easy stance for journalists writing about U.S.
counterterrorism—Mark Mazzetti’s new book, The Way
of the Knife, is a good example—because it automatically frames an oppositional narrative, one with dark undertones and intimations of unattractive, unintended
consequence. The blowback argument is also peculiarly
susceptible to raising the behavioral bar the United
States must meet in order to keep the local population
happy enough not to embrace suicide bombing and
terrorism. It defines terrorist deviancy down, while U.S.
and Western security behaviors are always defined up.
From a strategic standpoint, however, the trouble with the blowback theory is simple: It will always
counsel doing nothing rather than doing something.
It’s the kibitzer’s lazy objection. Whether one knows a
lot or a little about the action and its possible blowback
consequences, whether one has an axe to grind or is
reasonably objective, one can always offer the blowback scenario.
There might be situations in which to give it priority; Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen expert, for example,
says that a particular form of strike in Yemen causes
blowback because it hits low-level fighters whose families cannot understand the American justification.
(The response is, usually, that we are effectively fighting as the air arm of the Yemen government against its
insurgents, including its low-level fighters.) That bears
attention; whether it outweighs the strategic concern
of supporting the Yemeni government, which does
have to fight even low-level insurgents who in effect
offer protection to the transnational terrorist wing, is
another question. But we should consider it carefully.
Blowback is a form of the precautionary principle. But it’s awfully difficult to conduct war, after all,

19

on the basis of “first do no harm.” As it happens, the
United States once had a commander driven largely by
considerations of blowback from a restive local population. His name was George McClellan. If he had not
been replaced by Abraham Lincoln, the Union would
have lost the Civil War.

5.

The Ethical
Objection
EFFECTIVENESS IS ONE THING, MORALITY ANOTHER.

The leading objection to drone warfare today is that
it supposedly involves large, or “excessive,” numbers
of civilian casualties, and that the claims of precision
and discrimination are greatly overblown. These are
partly factual questions full of unknowns and many
contested issues. The Obama administration did not
help itself by offering estimates of civilian collateral
damage early on that ranged absurdly from zero to the
low two digits. This both squandered credibility with
the media and, worse, set a bar of perfection—zero
civilian collateral damage—that no weapon system
could ever meet, while distracting people entirely from
the crucial question of what standard civilian harms
should be set against.
The most useful estimates of civilian casualties
from targeted killing with drones come from the New
America Foundation (NAF) and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which each keep running counts
of strikes, locations, and estimates of total killed and
civilian casualties. They don’t pretend to know what
they don’t know, and rely on open sources and media
accounts. There is no independent journalistic access
to Waziristan to help corroborate accounts that might
be wrong or skewed by Taliban sources, Pakistani media, Pakistani and Western advocacy groups, or the
U.S. or Pakistani governments. Pakistan’s military
sometimes takes credit for drone strikes against its enemies and sometimes blames drone strikes for its own
air raids against villages. A third source of estimates,
UK-based The Bureau of Investigative Journalism
(TBIJ), comes up with higher numbers.
TBIJ (whose numbers are considered much too
high by many knowledgeable American observers)
came up with a range, notes Georgetown law professor and former Obama DOD official Rosa Brooks. The
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344 known drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and
2012 killed, according to TBIJ, between “2,562 and 3,325
people, of whom between 474 and 881 were civilians.”
The NAF, she continues, came up with slightly lower figures, somewhere “between 1,873 and 3,171 people killed
overall in Pakistan, of whom between 282 and 459 were
civilians.” (Media have frequently cited the total killed
as though it were the civilians killed.) Is this a lot of
civilians killed? Even accepting for argument’s sake
TBIJ’s numbers, Brooks concludes, if you work out the
“civilian deaths per drone strike ratio for the last eight
years . . . on average, each drone strike seems to have
killed between 0.8 and 2.5 civilians.” In practical terms,
adds McNeal, this suggests “less than three civilians
killed per strike, and that’s using the highest numbers”
of any credible estimating organization.*
Whether any of this is “disproportionate” or “excessive” as a matter of the laws of war cannot be answered simply by comparing total deaths to civilian
deaths, or civilian deaths per drone strike, however.
Although commentators often leap to a conclusion
in this way, one cannot answer the legal question of
proportionality without an assessment of the military
benefits anticipated. Moreover, part of the disputes
over numbers involves not just unverifiable facts on
the ground, but differences in legal views defining who
is a civilian and who is a lawful target. The U.S. government’s definition of those terms, following its longstanding views of the law of targeting in war, almost
certainly differs from those of TBIJ or other liberal
nongovernmental groups, particularly in Europe. Additionally, much of drone warfare today targets groups
* An often cited report, “Living Under Drones,” issued in 2012 by
advocacy law clinics at NYU and Stanford law schools, does not
merit the attention it has received. The study was solicited by a
UK anti-drone organization, Reprieve, which helped organize
the “study,” and which then sat in on some interviews. A Pakistani group closely linked to Reprieve, the Foundation for Fundamental Rights, which is engaged in multiple lawsuits against
the drone programs, selected the interviewees and also sat in on
interviews; the interviewees included nine of FFR’s own clients
in its anti-drone lawsuits. The foundation also partly funded
the study by paying for the transportation of interviewees. The
report invents a peculiar and novel category—“experiential
victims” of drones—apparently lacking enough direct family
members killed or injured in actual drone strikes to make the
numbers interesting. Crucially, this category includes “victims”
who might have witnessed not a drone strike but merely drone
surveillance, and also includes those who might be family members of a person from North Waziristan who might have witnessed something. In any case, those called “close family members” for purposes of establishing this “experiential” victimhood
include grandparents, parents, siblings, children, uncles, and
cousins. All of this is plainly laid out in “Living Under Drones”
and requires no special digging around for background facts; national-security columnist for PBS’s Need to Know, Joshua Foust,
walked through numerous methodological inadequacies of the
report in an article for the Atlantic online on September 26, 2012.
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who are deemed, under the laws of war, to be part of
hostile forces. Targeted killing aimed at individuated
high-value targets is a much smaller part of drone warfare than it once was. The targeting of groups, however, while lawful under long-standing U.S. interpretations of the laws of war, might result in casualties often
counted by others as civilians.
Yet irrespective of what numbers one accepts
as the best estimate of harms of drone warfare, or the
legal proportionality of the drone strikes, the moral
question is simply, What’s the alternative? One way
to answer this is to start from the proposition that if
you believe the use of force in these circumstances is
lawful and ethical, then all things being equal as an
ethical matter, the method of force used should be
the one that spares the most civilians while achieving its lawful aims. If that is the comparison of moral
alternatives, there is simply no serious way to dispute
that drone warfare is the best method available. It
is more discriminating and more precise than other
available means of air warfare, including manned
aircraft—as France and Britain, lacking their own
drones and forced to rely on far less precise manned
jet strikes, found over Libya and Mali—and Tomahawk
cruise missiles.
A second observation is to look across the history of precision weapons in the past several decades.
I started my career as a human-rights campaigner,
kicking off the campaign to ban landmines for leading
organizations. Around 1990, I had many conversations with military planners, asking them to develop
more accurate and discriminating weapons—ones
with smaller kinetic force and greater ability to put the
force where sought. Although every civilian death is a
tragedy, and drone warfare is very far from being the
perfect tool the Obama administration sometimes suggests, for someone who has watched weapons development over a quarter century, the drone represents
a steady advance in precision that has cut zeroes off
collateral-damage figures.
Those who see only the snapshot of civilian harm
today are angered by civilian deaths. But barring an
outbreak of world peace, it is foolish and immoral not
to encourage the development and use of more sparing
and exact weapons. One has only to look at the campaigns of the Pakistani army to see the alternatives in
action. The Pakistani military for many years has been
in a running war with its own Taliban and has regularly attacked villages in the tribal areas with heavy
and imprecise airstrikes. A few years ago, it thought
it had reached an accommodation with an advancing
Taliban, but when the enemy decided it wanted not
just the Swat Valley but Islamabad, the Pakistani gov-
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ernment decided it had no choice but to drive it back.
And it did, with a punishing campaign of airstrikes
and rolling artillery barrages that leveled whole villages, left hundreds of thousands without homes, and
killed hundreds.
But critics do not typically evaluate drones
against the standards of the artillery barrage of
manned airstrikes, because their assumption, explicit
or implicit, is that there is no call to use force at all. And
of course, if the assumption is that you don’t need or
should not use force, then any civilian death by drones
is excessive. That cannot be blamed on drone warfare,
its ethics or effectiveness, but on a much bigger question of whether one ought to use force in counterterrorism at all.

6.

The Ethical
Objection, Globalized
THE OBJECTION TO CIVILIAN DEATHS DRAWS OUT A

related criticism: Why should the United States be able
to conduct these drone strikes in Pakistan or in Yemen,
countries that are not at war with America? What gives
the United States the moral right to take its troubles to
other places and inflict damage by waging war? Why
should innocent Pakistanis suffer because the United
States has trouble with terrorists?
The answer is simply that like it or not, the
terrorists are in these parts of Pakistan, and it is the
terrorists that have brought trouble to the country.
The U.S. has adopted a moral and legal standard with
regard to where it will conduct drone strikes against
terrorist groups. It will seek consent of the government, as it has long done with Pakistan, even if that is
contested and much less certain than it once was. But
there will be no safe havens. If al-Qaeda or its affiliated
groups take haven somewhere and the government is
unwilling or unable to address that threat, America’s
very long-standing view of international law permits it
to take forcible action against the threat, sovereignty
and territorial integrity notwithstanding.
This is not to say that the United States could
or would use drones anywhere it wished. Places that
have the rule of law and the ability to respond to terrorists on their territory are different from weakly
governed or ungoverned places. There won’t be drones
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over Paris or London—this canard is popular among
campaigners and the media but ought to be put to rest.
But the vast, weakly governed spaces, where states are
often threatened by Islamist insurgency, such as Mali
or Yemen, are a different case altogether.
This critique often leads, however, to the further objection that the American use of drones is essentially laying the groundwork for others to do the
same. Steve Coll wrote in the New Yorker: “America’s
drone campaign is also creating an ominous global
precedent. Ten years or less from now, China will likely
be able to field armed drones. How might its Politburo
apply Obama’s doctrines to Tibetan activists holding
meetings in Nepal?”
The United States, it is claimed, is arrogantly
exerting its momentary technological advantage to
do what it likes. It will be sorry when other states follow suit. But the United States does not use drones
in this fashion and has claimed no special status for
drones. The U.S. government uses drone warfare in a
far more limited way, legally and morally, and entirely
within the bounds of international law. The problem
with China (or Russia) using drones is that they might
not use them in the same way as the United States.
The drone itself is a tool. How it is used and against
whom—these are moral questions. If China behaves
malignantly, drones will not be responsible. Its leaders will be.
Finally, drone warfare is often objected to on the
premise that the reduced risks to one’s own soldiers
might tempt political leaders to resort to force more
than they should. As a moral objection, however, this
is simply wrong. It is probably true that drone warfare
makes it easier to use force—though the proposition
that it is “too easy” depends entirely on whether one
sees any particular use of force as just or unjust. While
many assume that the use of force needs to be made
more difficult, in the case of humanitarian intervention, where NATO countries are loath to risk their
forces, one might say it is exactly the other way around.
In any case, it is an immoral argument that posits soldiers as mere means to pressure political leadership. Soldiers take risks against the enemy for reasons
of military necessity. But they don’t exist to put pressure on their own political leaders. That would be to
use them as hostages.
It is a most remarkable state of affairs, however,
that advocacy and campaigning groups—dedicated
over the decades to demanding that war’s risks to civilians be reduced—have so thoroughly bought into an
argument that the fundamental problem of drones is
that they threaten to make war less harmful to civilians as well as soldiers.
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7.

The Future
of Drone Warfare
THOUGH THE CRITICS ARE WRONG TO CLAIM THAT

drone warfare itself is neither effective nor ethical,
they are not wrong to inquire about process and policy
concerns. Drone warfare and the development of tools
for using force in discrete and focused ways are inviting novel questions of law, ethics, and policy. The list
of matters that need legislative and administrative reform in order to put drone warfare and targeted killing
on an institutionally stable footing is a long one.
As “associated forces” of al-Qaeda evolve and
fragment into groups only notionally connected to the
al-Qaeda of 9/11, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) looks increasingly threadbare. At
some point, whether by the increasingly tenuous connection of new groups to the AUMF or by the appearance of some wholly new terrorist threat unrelated in
any way to 9/11 or al-Qaeda or jihadis, the president
will have to act either under his own constitutional
authority or obtain a new congressional authorization.
It is also the case that the definition of “covert
action” itself needs to be revised to take into account
operations that now span a range from truly secret to
unacknowledged to plausibly deniable to only preposterously deniable. Congress and the president must address
the fundamental question of which policies, processes,
means, methods, and operations must remain secret and
which ought to be revealed for public discussion.
There is little indication that either the Congress or the president has any appetite for addressing
many, if any, of the serious questions. Instead there is
grandstanding by Republicans and Democrats alike,
grandiloquent speeches on the Constitution, and precious little attention paid to how citizens who have
taken up armed conflict and terrorism against the
United States should actually be uncovered and dealt
with. That’s apart from the propensity of Congress to
go AWOL on its oversight responsibilities and punt
to a bunch of judges so it doesn’t have to take any
blame for killing an innocent American or allowing an
American terrorist in Yemen to direct the killing of innocent Americans.
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Without a hardheaded effort on the part of Congress and the executive branch to make drone policy,
the efforts to discredit drones will continue. The current
wide public support in the United States today should
not mask the ways in which public perception and sentiment can be shifted, here and abroad. The campaign of
delegitimation is modeled on the one against Guantanamo Bay during the George W. Bush administration; the
British campaigning organization Reprieve tweets that
it will make drones the Obama administration’s Guantanamo. Then as now, administration officials did not, or
were unforgivably slow to, believe that a mere civil-society campaign could force a reset of their policies. They
miscalculated then and, as former Bush administration
officials John Bellinger and Jack Goldsmith have repeatedly warned, they might well be miscalculating now.
U.S. counterterrorism policy overall needs to
be embedded in policies, processes, and laws that get
beyond mere executive-branch discretion and bear the
stamp of the two political branches coming together
in tools available in a stable way across presidential
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administrations of both parties. We are not there now.
While the critics are not wrong to call for reform of
drone-warfare processes, many of them see these merely as the first step to ending drone warfare altogether.
They are advocating procedural reforms not to give it a
permanent and steady framework for the long run, but
effectively to outlaw the practice.
Republicans should not be enablers in this effort. They should not mimic the disgraceful behavior
of Democrats during the Bush-era war on terror.
They should be moving—especially in Congress—
to offer firm institutional and political support to
drone warfare as a legitimate, effective, legal, ethical, and necessary tool of counterterrorism. Republicans in Congress should stand with the president
on the main issue of drone warfare, to shore up the
foundations of its legitimacy. They should do this
not only because it is the right thing to do, but as
a practical matter—to preserve this key element of
21st-century defense for future presidents, among
whom there will surely be a Republican or two.q
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